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Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST.

The United States of America, etc.
versus
ARAKI, Sadao, etc.

Affidavit under Oath. (*translation*)

Affidavit ENDO, Saburo

According to the form employed in our country, after taking oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am ENDO, Saburo.
2. My present address is Irimagawamachi Irima County, Saitama Prefecture.
3. My birth place is Komatsumachi, Higashi-Okitama County, Yamagata Prefecture.
4. I was born on January 2, 26th year of Meiji (TN: 1893).
5. The main points of my academic career are as follow:
Graduated from the Military Academy in May, 3rd year of Taisho (TN: 1914).
Graduated from the advanced courses of the Artillery and Engineering School in November, 6th year of Taisho (TN: 1917)
Graduated from the Military Staff College in November, 11th year of Taisho (TN: 1922).

Graduated from the Military Staff College of Paris in October, 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929).

6. The main points of my personal history are as follow:

Commissioned a Sub-Lientenant of Artillery (Class 26) in December, 3rd year of Taisho (TN: 1914).

Worked at the General Staff Office from December, 12th year of Taisho (TN: 1923).

Became a member of the General Staff Office from August, 13th year of Taisho (TN: 1924).

A resident-officer in France from March, 15th year of Taisho (TN: 1926).

A member of the General Staff Office from December, 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929).

A staff-officer of the Kwantung Army from August, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932).

Became a professor of strategy at the Military Staff College from August, 9th year of Showa (TN: 1934).

The head of a section of the General Staff Office, a staff-officer of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters from November, 12th year of Showa (TN: 1937).

Vice-Chief of the Staff of the Kwantung Army; participated in the Nomonhan Incident, in September, 14th year of Showa (TN: 1939).

President of the Army Aviation Academy, in January, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943).

Chief of the Executive Department at the Headquarters of the Army Aviation in May, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943)

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Promoted to the first rank of the higher civil service.

Director of the General Ordnance Bureau for Aviation in November, 18th year of Showa (TN: 1943).

Relieved of his post in August, 20th year of Showa (TN: 1945).

7. As it is stated above, with the exception of my duty abroad from March of 15th year of Taisho (TN: 1926) to December of 4th year of Showa (TN: 1929) I served at the Second Section of the General Staff Office and participated in the operations plan of that office since 12th year of Taisho (TN: 1923) to August, 7th year of Showa (1932). During this period, the Manchurian Incident arose on September 18, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931). I was then a major and tried to perform my duties. In August, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932), I was appointed a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army and went to Manchuria with General MUTO, Chief of the Kwantung Army (dead) General KOISO, Chief of the Staff, both assuming new posts, and others. At the time when Manchurian Incident arose, the General Staff Office was composed of such members as General KANAYA, Hanzo (dead), Chief of the General Staff, Lt. General NINOMIYA, Harushige (dead), Vice-Chief, Major General TATEKATA, Yoshitsugu (dead) Head of the First Department (operations), Major General UMEZU, Yoshijiro (later General), Chief of the Executive Department, Major General HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke (later Lt. General), Head of the Second Department (information), Colonel INAMURA, Isao (later General), Head of the Second Section (operations), etc.
8. As it is clear in the foregoing statements I was involved in, and therefore I knew very well that various circumstances

which dominated the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command before and after the rise of Manchurian Incident, the development of the Incident and the relations between the Central Authorities in Tokyo and the Kwantung Army up to August, 9th year of Showa (TN: 1934).

9. I shall at first speak on a summary of the general phase of the operations plan. As there is no country without an operations plan so long as there is an army, so Japan always had her own operations plan as well. Namely, every year the operations plan was renewed for the following year according to the estimate made of the prevailing situation, and the Second Department of the General Staff Office was responsible for estimating the situation, while the Second Section of the First Department of the same office was responsible for the operations plan. Thus the plan which was drawn up by the Second Section would go through channels before it received approval of the Chief of the General Staff; when it became a definite program, the operations plan for the year concerned was established around August or September. This program covered the period from April 1 of next year to March 31 of the following year. When this Annual operations plan was established, the "orders" based upon this program were sent out to each stationary troop. Hence this order set the standard by which to decide the operations plan of each troop within the framework of the above plan. Each out-post army (for example like the Kwantung Army) drew up its own operations plan according to the above order and submitted it to the

Chief of the General Staff on the whole before the end of September of each year.

The foregoing was the actual circumstances by which the operations plan of the Japanese Empire was drawn up, and this was done so purely on the assumption that if by any chance a war should arise during that current year, and, therefore, its execution was entirely another question. Namely, it was executed only by the Imperial Command after the Cabinet decision was made upon declaration of war. Of course, when this was put into motion, the Chief of the General Staff as the highest staff-officer had to make a direct appeal to the Throne. It is a great mistake, therefore, if the above plan should be interpreted as a definite operations plan to be put into execution. Furthermore, it should be added that even though there was no possibility of the outbreak of war during that current year judging from the situations both within the country and abroad, the army might draw up by necessity an annual operations plan on the basis of military education and as the standard of arms that the Imperial Empire should have maintained, because by its own specific feature it was impossible for the army to have its armaments completely equipped in a short time.

10. The operations plan for the year when Manchurian Incident occurred was drawn up in 5th year of Showa (TN: 1930) as the operations plan for the current year of 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931). Had it been possible to submit this plan, it was obvious that the Central Authorities for the Supreme

Command had no plan for Manchurian Incident or aggressive intention in those days. It is to be regretted, however, that all these papers were burnt up at the close of the War. By following up the memories of those days, I shall attempt to state the internal conditions regarding the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command and a summary of the operations plan in the following. The 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) was the year in which "Geneva" Armament Reduction Conference was held and enthusiasm for reduction of armament in those days was extremely high. Even those of us who were engaged in planning operations were deeply absorbed in the problem of limitation of armaments. Our concern, therefore, was how to cope with this period of reduction of armaments and to ensure the minimum military preparation necessary for the national defense rather than pondering on the question of war with foreign countries. Therefore, the operations plan was based commonsensibly upon the fact that the military forces of Japan were planned in accordance with those of other countries concerned so that only an outline which permitted a certain degree of operations necessary for the national defense was considered. The operation plan schemed by the General Staff Office against China in those days was aimed at safeguarding our interests in Manchuria and China, and at protecting our nationals resident in those districts affected, its primary objective being operations covering North China and the shores of the lower reaches of the Yangtze River (the Chang Chiang), especially the east

of Nanking. The soldiers belonging to the Kwantung Army in Manchuria merely numbered around 10,000; one half of which was an independent garrison and its duty was to protect the South Manchurian Railways, the other half was a resident army division whose duty was to escort the detached forces which were sent over from Japan.

As to the operations plan against U.S.S. Russia the point of concentration was south of the Second Sungari River and the chief scene of the battle was to take place at the south of Harbin and near Taonan. There never was the case where an active operations plan in Manchuria was drawn up; still less, to say nothing of, the case to draw up an aggressive operations plan against U.S.S. Russia, because the national strength of Japan in those days did not allow it.

In fact, the Imperial Army reduced just then four divisions automatically, and, in spite of the opposition by the younger officers and others, the man who gave approval for the reduction of armaments was Major General HATA, Shunroku (later Marshal), then Chief of the Operations Department of the General Staff Office. I believe, therefore, these incidents will indorse that the Japanese Empire was loyal to the reduction of armaments and had no intention of starting an aggressive war.

11. The circumstances concerning the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command at the time when Manchurian Incident arose were as I have stated in the foregoing statements, and there was no thought on the part of the Central Authorities of

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carrying into effect of a grand campaign for the entire China. This is also clear how Japan despatched her troops at the time of the first Shanghai Incident in the following year, that is in February, 7th year of Showa (TN: 1932). Namely, when an attack was made by the Chinese troops near Shanghai, our Naval landing forces stationed there did their best to protect our nationals, attempting solely to check the expansion of the battlegrounds. Pressure of the 19th Army was increasingly strengthened, however, and as the Navy alone could no longer sustain the situation, we decided, by the request of the Navy but inevitably in self-defense, to send our army troops to aid the urgent need; and yet in order to avoid the aggravation of the war we landed in Shanghai in front of the enemy expecting to lose many lives for it, and did not land at the back of the enemy, though we were fully aware of its strategic disadvantage, and the duty of our troops was limited to the protection of our nationals resident there.

By this fact alone it can readily be understood that we had no aggressive intention nor did we act under the totally controlled plan.

12. Just before to the Incident of September 18 (TN: 1931) the relation between the Kwantung Army and that of CHANG Hsueh-liang was strained to such a degree that it was exposed to the point of explosion at the slightest touch, as it was stated in the Lytton Report, and among the hot-headed group there were some who felt very strongly that unless something

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was done to repulse the pressure made by the Chinese Authority (CHANG Hsueh-liang), Japan would finally be led to destruction.

13. Because the despatch of Major General TATEKAWA to Manchuria incidentally coincided with the date of Liutiaokou Incident, it was misunderstood by some as though there had been some direct connection between the two, but this was entirely unfounded.

As previously stated, the insult against Japan by Hsueh-liang's force developed into resistance to Japan, infringement of interests and oppression of Japanese nationals, furthermore the insult against Japanese armed forces was greatly aggravated as time went on, but because of the national policy of peace through diplomacy, we were strongly urged to be patient and prudent, and consequently even the morale of the army was in danger of being influenced (was depressed). Therefore, in August, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931), in order to warn against rash acts and to encourage the morale, War Minister MINAMI made an address of instruction concerning resolution of the Army. But unfortunately Captain NAKAMURA's incident was also announced, and this unexpectedly produced such a strong response that an unofficial information such as the Japanese Army in Manchuria would start an active move at any moment was issued. The Central Authorities, therefore, despatched Major General TATEKAWA in order to make clear concerning the source of such unofficial information and to convey to the Kwantung Army their real intention.

14. When the Incident arose on September 18, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931), I was suffering from gastric ulcer and on the

19th I was scheduled to be sent to the hospital of the Army Medical College. On that morning, however, as I received the news which reported the rise of the Incident, I was obliged to change my plan and hastily went to my office. It was wholly such an unforeseen occurrence. Therefore, the opinion concerning the despatch of a portion of the military forces of the Japanese Army in Korea, for instance, differed between the Ministry of War and the General Staff Office so that the regular order was issued at last on September 22 as a ratification of an act.

15. Soon after the rise of the Incident, the Imperial Government had decided upon a policy of non-aggravation of the situation. In conformity with that policy, therefore, the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command held a conference of the leaders of the General Staff Office and of the War Ministry on the morning of September 19, and recognized the action of the Kwantung Army as exercising the right of self-defense based upon its duty. On the same day a report was received that a brigade of the Japanese Army in Korea would be despatched to Manchuria for the purpose of reinforcement, but the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command acted firmly to check it. For that reason that brigade was unable to pass the boundary of the Yalu River, and was detained for two long days (48 hours) in the train in the midst of the hottest season. The sudden change in the situation in Kilin, however, did not allow a moment of delay, and therefore on September 21, it finally crossed the boundary by arbitrary decision. Again we found out that its trespassing the

boundary by arbitrary decision as a ratification of an act was by no means to abandon the policy of non-aggravation, but rather was necessitated by the circumstances in the district affected. Moreover, from the standpoint of commanding an army it was impossible to have the brigade return right away to its place. To leave it alone, however, would be liable to leave the root of calamity and evil practices in future. Hence the order was issued. Such being the case the brigade was ordered to return to Korea as soon as the conditions in Manchuria came to a state of lull at a time.

16. Since then efforts towards the settlement of the Incident were continually made through negotiations by the Central Authorities. Due to, however, the lack of the real grasp of the urgent situation at the district affected by the Central Authorities on the Japanese side, and on the Chinese side still worse situation in addition to the special circumstances (lack of control as an independent nation), etc., the negotiations did not progress and were unwillingly brought to a deadlock. The Kwantung Army in Manchuria, however, ardently desired to fulfil its duties to the very end, because it faced the actual circumstances that should the Incident be left unsettled, the more than 200,000 CHANG'S troops, which had already been out of control, would become bandits over the entire Manchuria and would provoke serious problems that would not only threaten our interests but ignore humanity.
17. The Central Authorities seemed merely to advocate the abstract policy of non-aggravation and restlessly attempted to resume

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the situation which prevailed before the outbreak of the Incident (the trend of the U.S.S. Russia was feared then to the extent that they were almost seized by a Soviet-phobia), and they seemed not to have any concrete policy for the settlement. As there was a lack of complete understanding between the Kwantung Army and the Central Authorities men were despatched several times in order to grasp the real situation in Manchuria and to convey thoroughly the real intention of the Central Authorities.

18. In the first place, as soon as we were informed of the outbreak of Liutiaokou Incident, we sent Colonel ANDO, Rikichi (later General), then Chief of Military Service Section of the War Ministry to investigate the actual facts of the case. We made him investigate thoroughly if Liutiaokou Incident was started by the Kwantung Army, if the military action then taken was not arbitrary and in excess of its vested powers, if it intentionally set aside the Chinese proposal for complete peace and took one-sided action, etc. And we received a report in the negative over all those questions.
19. Second was the despatch of HASHIMOTO section. This section had its group leader Major General HASHIMOTO, Toranosuke, Chief of the Second Department of the General Staff Office, and included three other members: myself, a member of the Second Section of the First Department (Operations) of the same office, IMAI, Takeo (then captain) of the China Section and NISHIHARA, Issaku (then major), a member of Military

Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry from the field of military administration. The chief duty of this section was to act as liaison officers between the Central Authorities and the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, and therefore we tried to convey to the Kwantung Army that it should consider the national policy of the Japanese Empire thoroughly and that matters which would have grave influence upon it should not be decided upon merely by the judgement of the Kwantung Army but it should try to ask for instructions from the Central Authorities. The Central Authorities in those days were not well informed of the real state of affairs concerning the Incident, and concerning the action of the Kwantung Army on important matters, it was considered necessary to have the Kwantung Army ask for instructions from the Central Authorities. Thus the above party left Tokyo on September 24, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) and arrived at Mukden on September 28 and stayed there until November 3 of the same year discharging its duties.

Upon arriving at Manchuria we were in touch with the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, and after investigating the state of affairs, we clearly understood the situation.

We understood well what the Kwantung Army considered and acted upon, all of which had justifiable reasons. Moreover we strongly felt that how the Central Authorities lacked understanding and grasp of the situation and we thought something must be done.

During our stay there, I travelled in North Manchuria in

order to investigate the situation there, especially the possibility of a clash between the U.S.S. Russia and Japan. And the conclusion I arrived at after this travel of investigation was as follows: in order to settle this Incident quickly it was necessary to stabilize early the conditions in North Manchuria before confusion took place there, as the Kwantung Army considered, and as Commander HONJO said, I felt very keenly that unless we subjugated North Manchuria immediately, it might give an opportunity to the U.S.S. Russia to march into that district and would offer a great probability of a clash between Russia and Japan. And therefore I wired a message to that effect from Harbin to Tokyo. This was disapproved by the Tokyo Authorities, because they thought I was Manchurianized since I came to Manchuria and discarded the non-aggravation policy (then Manchuria was looked upon as our Cleopatra, because any one who visited there was charmed by the circumstances prevailing there and assumed a positive view of the matter). I was immediately ordered to return to Tokyo.

During my stay in Manchuria, I had the privilege of seeing HONJO, Shigeru, the Commander of the Army frequently, and I clearly learned that the Commander had an excellent opinion concerning the settlement of the Incident, and that he was a man who led the Kwantung Army according to his own conviction and opinions. I learned that the popular judgment that the Commander HONJO was a puppet was entirely unfounded.

20. The third was the despatch of General SHIRAKAWA (dead). General SHIRAKAWA was then a supreme war councillor and an elder general of the Japanese Army. On October 16, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) the so-called October Incident was discovered in Tokyo. The Central Military Authorities were greatly surprised, and especially as the rumor was rampant as to the rebellion of the young officers of the Kwantung Army, the general was despatched to persuade them and he arrived at Mukden on October 21. I was then staying at Mukden as a member of HASHIMOTO Section. I went to Antung to meet him and reported the fact that it was a pure demagogism and baseless fears and that the Kwantung Army was very indignant at the lack of understanding of the situation on the part of the Central Authorities, because at that time the Kwantung Army was solely devoted in the discharge of its duties. General SHIRAKAWA seemed ashamed of, but at the same time felt relieved of the matter and returned to Tokyo.
21. The fourth was the despatch of the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, NINOMIYA in the latter part of November, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931). As stated above the policy of the Central Authorities concerning the present Incident was of complete non-aggravation which viewed from the authority in charge of the district affected was extremely conservative and negative. Especially there was no territorial ambition in the least and no active intentions. The military factions of Hsueh-liang were then scattered all over North Manchuria and the public feeling was in turmoil. While the Kwantung

Army considered it an absolute necessity to occupy Chichi-har in order to stabilize the situation in North Manchuria, the Central Authorities thought it necessary to withdraw troops from Chichi-har without losing time for fear of the Russo-Japanese clash, and the opinions did not agree. Therefore with the intention of having the troops withdraw, upon investigating the true situation, even by the issue of an Imperial command, if necessary, the Central Authorities sent the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, NINOMIYA to Manchuria with this order with him. Upon his arrival, however, it was found that the action taken by the Kwantung Army was appropriate and the idea of withdrawing the troops was given up.

22. As seen in the above statements with the shifting of the Incident, the Central Authorities passively assumed the policy of non-aggravation which was not practicable, and was particularly afraid (almost to the extent of morbid fear) of the action that might be taken by the Soviet taking advantage of this Incident, and merely thought of resuming the conditions prevailed previous to the Incident, whereas the Kwantung Army based its policy on the fulfillment of its duties standing on the prevailing circumstances, in order to recover public peace and order in Manchuria and insure our life line. The objective was one but the method was not always the same. As the officers on these missions clarified the real circumstances, however, the opinions of the Central Authorities and the Kwantung Army at last came to an agreement. I may mention here incidentally a few words concerning non-

aggravation. At the time when Manchurian Incident broke out, the word "non-aggravation" was thought a kind of a cant but its real meaning or its concrete policy was not known clearly at all, and it was rather thought to be extremely abstract and to stand for a negative policy. When General ARAKI became the War Minister, however, he told me in person on the point of "non-aggravation" that it was necessary to consider the word analytically. Namely, if we sought to avert the expansion in area and in military force, it might likely lead to an expansion in time as a result; if we averted protraction of time, the numerical strength of an army and area might expand. What was needed most at that moment was to settle the Incident swiftly. Thus he said that non-aggravation in time was our chief concern and if necessary expansion in area and numerical strength of the army might be unavoidable. I was deeply impressed by his far-sightedness.

Since the rise of the Incident the numerical strength of the army was increased and the area was expanded, but this by no means meant forsaking the non-aggravation policy, but rather was the natural result of the event. The reason why it took such a long time could be explained by the fact that we were dazzled by the word "non-aggravation of the situation" and were too much constraint in regard to the military forces and area.

23. As previously mentioned, I clearly understood that judging from the objective situation prevailing, the military action of the Kwantung Army, which had its initial start in Liutiaok Incident, was an inevitable act of self-defense, because as

a member of HASHIMOTO Section I went to Manchuria and became thoroughly acquainted with the actual circumstances there. I understood that even if Liutiaokou Explosion Incident had not occurred, the actual condition was on the critical point of explosion at some or other occasion. As to the true cause of Liutiaokou Incident, even the Lytton Committee was unable to examine into it closely, and I suspect that it might remain as an eternal mystery, and I consider such an incident as this is a mere occurrence which is not very important compared with the development of a fundamental and fatalistic state of affairs.

24. The action taken by the Kwantung Army since Liutiaokou Incident was so swift and successful that it was at time viewed as deliberate, but this is a layman's idea. A military expert would say that there were many errors and that for a permanently stationed army they made very poor operations plans. I can give an example to illustrate this from what I saw as a member of HASHIMOTO Section: in the case of the attack at Kuanchengtzu a certain corps mistook it for mere maneuvers and got underway accordingly; again the mountain-guns were dismantled on that day for the purpose of repair and they could not assemble them and therefore they summoned to the battleground the reservists of mountain artillery from Changchun and at last the guns were assembled and the firing was started. The corps in that district, therefore, had to go through a bitter contested battle and had sustained a loss that was unnecessarily great.

25. During the Incident the Kwantung Army was restricted in the

use of the forces by the Central Authorities and was often driven to serious difficulties. For example, due to the fact that the reinforcement from the Japanese Army in Korea was halted, there was no force available to guard Mukden and was obliged to form a volunteer corps of reservists and others for its helpless guard; in the pursuit battle to Chichi-har it was frequently limited in its advanced lines; in crossing the North Manchurian Railway it was prohibited to pass other than railway crossings; and in advancing toward Chinchow and Harbin it was ordered to discard the plan and was obliged to send its troops back.

26. The Kwantung Army on its part made a representation concerning the circumstances to the Central Authorities and at time acted upon its own authority, because it could not wait for the order from above, but this is not necessarily to be taken as acting beyond its vested powers; rather most of it should be given approval.
27. I should like to state here concerning the arbitrary action of the Kwantung Army. Of course it was the duty of the commander of the Kwantung Army to obey absolutely when he received the Imperial Order, but otherwise the army commander acted properly and arbitrarily on his own responsibility and this was recognized as military common sense in our Army. As the result there were sometimes differences of opinions between the Army and the General Staff Office. The understanding of the Central Authorities was inadequate, hence delay in taking proper action, and the local army was obliged at

times to take arbitrary action, because it could not wait long for the Imperial Command. Therefore since the General Staff Office established a closer relation with the local army on one hand, and the Chief of the General Staff attained a certain degree of power enabling him to issue orders direct to the commander of the Kwantung Army since November 5, 6th year of Showa (TN: 1931) on the other, the control of the Central Authorities was put in a perfect state .

28. Then I shall state on the conception of the founding of Manchurian State at that time. At the time when Manchurian Incident arose the Central Authorities for the Supreme Command had no definite plan as to its disposal, and opinions were divided. Much time was spent before the final conclusion was reached. I do not think there was any one who had conceived such an excellent opinion as that of establishing an independent state then. When I was in Manchuria as a member of HASHIMOTO Section, General MINAMI, the War Minister, even pointed out to HONJO, the Commander of the Army that "On such an internal question as who should assume the administrative power, the army stationed there should not be concerned." HONJO, the Commander of the Army was desirous of the establishment of a pro-Japanese Government strong enough to stabilize Manchuria in order to discharge his duty of maintaining public peace and order in Manchuria immediately and of protecting our interests and nationals there.
- In the middle of October, I heard Mr. YU, Chung-han's (dead) ideal of the founding of an empire. He said that history

shows that the Chinese people was a race which was unable to employ force of arms properly. From time immemorial ^{over} soldiers had been regarded as destructive weapons, and when employed they were likely to assume military rule, and therefore Manchuria should be made a land of peace without military force and based upon the principles of royalty: namely, it should be established to be a paradise for the five races living in harmony. This coincided with my ideal I had then as I already stated before in connection with disarmament problem, and I thought very highly of and was wholly in sympathy with Mr. YU, Chung-han's opinions. When I visited the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army to take my leave for Tokyo at the early part of November, KATAKURA, a staff-office told me for the first time that ^{viewed} from the circumstances thus developed, it was ideal to settle the matter by establishing an independent state, and I was asked to convey that ^{opinion} when I returned to Tokyo, along with the atmosphere prevailing ^{make} in Manchuria to the high officials and at the same time to ^{make} efforts to materialize it. After my return to Tokyo, I conveyed these messages to people at various quarters, but even Major General TATEKAWA, Chief of the First Department of the General Staff Office and Lieutenant Colonel NEMOTO, Leader of the China Section, who were considered as holding the most positive opinions at that time, did not pay much attention to it and said that an independent administrative power would probably be the most we could expect. Thus in the Central Authorities no one had such a farsighted conception as the

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establishment of an independent state, but everybody was ^{simu} concerned with the idea of immediate and peaceful settlement of the Incident.

Nevertheless, starting with the Incident there arose a surge of sentiment among the people in Manchuria for independence which developed and at last a sovereign state was established.

As stated above there was absolutely no intentional plan or common deliberation of founding Manchurian State previous to the Incident, to say nothing of the establishment of a fictitious state artificially planned which was based upon territorial ambition. The founding of Manchurian State was a natural course of the event based upon a true ideal, and if I am allowed to express my own opinion, I still believe that it was accomplished by the divine will, and by having Manchuria ^{rise} as an ideal sovereign state can we really maintain peace in the Orient, and it can be a great foundation stone for the world peace.

October 12, 21st year of Showa (TN: 1941)
Tokyo

Affidavit: ENDO, Saburo

I hereby testify that the aforementioned had taken an oath before this witness and affixed his signature.

The same day.

Tokyo

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi.

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O A T H

I hereby swear that according to my conscience I shall
state truth, conceal nothing and add nothing.

ENDO, Saburo
(his seal affixed)

not used

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樞東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木 貞 夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 近 藤 三 郎

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ
如ク供述致シマス

一、私ハ遠藤三郎デアリマス。

二、私ノ現住所ハ埼玉縣入間郡入間川町デアリマス。

三、私ノ出生地ハ山形縣東置賜郡小松町デアリマス。

四、私ノ生年月日ハ明治二十六年（一八九三年）一月二日デアリマス。

五、私ノ學歷ノ重ナルモノハ次ノ通りデアリマス。

大正 三年（一九一四年）五月 陸軍士官學校卒業

大正 六年（一九一七年）十一月 陸軍砲工學校高等科卒業

大正 十一年（一九二二年）十一月 陸軍大學校卒業

昭和 四年（一九二九年）十月 巴黎陸軍大學校卒業

六、私ノ經歷ノ重ナルモノハ次ノ通りデアリマス

大正 三年（一九一四年）十二月 陸軍砲兵少尉任官（第廿六期）

大正 十二年（一九二三年）十二月 參謀本部勤務

大正 十三年（一九二四年）八月 參謀本部員

大正 十五年（一九二六年）三月 佛國駐在員

昭和四年（一九二九年）十二月	參謀本部々員
昭和七年（一九三二年）八月	關東軍參謀
昭和九年（一九三四年）八月	陸軍大學校兵學教官
昭和十二年（一九三七年）十一月	參謀本部課長 大本營陸軍部參謀
昭和十四年（一九三九年）九月	關東軍參謀團長ノモンハン事件ニ參加
昭和十八年（一九四三年）一月	陸軍航空士官學校長
同年五月	陸軍航空本部總務部長
同年十一月	高等官一等 航空兵器總局長官
昭和二十年（一九四五年）八月	免官

七、上述ノ如ク私ハ大正十二年（一九二三年）以來昭和七年（一九三二年）八月迄大正十五年（一九二六年）三月ヨリ昭和四年（一九二九年）十二月迄ノ外國駐在間ヲ除キ參謀本部第二課（作戰）ニ勤務シ參謀本部ノ作戰計畫ニ參劄シテ居マシタ。其ノ間ニ昭和六年九月十八日滿洲

事變ノ勃發ヲ見タ次第デ當時ハ少佐トシテ擔任業務ノ遂行ニ努メマシ
 タ。翌昭和七年八月關東軍參謀ニ補セラレ武藏關東軍司令官（死亡）
 小磯參謀長等（何レモ新任）ト共ニ滿洲ニ赴キマシタ。滿洲事變勃發
 當時ノ參謀本部ノ陣容ハ參謀總長金谷範三大將（死亡）同次長二宮治
 重中將（死亡）第一部長（作戰）建川美次少將（死亡）總務部長梅津
 美治郎少將（後大將）第二部長（情報）橋本虎之助少將（後中將）第
 二課長（作戰）今村功大佐（後大將）等デアリマシタ。

八、以上ノ様ニ次第デ私ハ滿洲事變勃發前後ノ中央閣議ニ於ケル諸事
 情及爾後昭和九年八月ニ至ル迄ノ事變ノ進展トイハズ及爾後事トノ關係
 ニ付テハ身ヲ以テ體驗デ知シタノデアリマス。

九、私ハ先ヅ一體ノ作戰計畫ノ提議ニ付テ申上マシ
 抑々軍ノ存スル所、作戰計畫ヲ持タナイ國ハ何處ニモナク様ニ我帝國
 ニ於テモ常ニ作戰計畫ヲ持ツテ居タノデアリマス。且チ毎年翌年度ノ
 情勢ヲ判斷シ年度毎ニ作戰計畫ヲ策定更新スルノデアリマシテ參謀本
 部第二部ガ情勢判斷ノ主務部デアリ參謀本部第一第二課ガ作戰計畫

ノ主務部課デアリマス。即チ第二課ニ於テ立案セラレタ計畫ハ順序ヲ經テ參謀總長ノ決裁ヲ受ケ成案トシ毎年八、九月ノ交ニ當該年度作戦計畫ハ確定スルノデアリマス。而シテ此ノ計畫ハ翌年四月一日ヨリ次ノ年ノ三月三十一日ニ至ルモノデアリマス。此ノ年度作戦計畫ノ確定ト共ニ出先各軍ニ對シ右作戦計畫ニ基ク「訓令」ガ發セラレルノデアリマス。即チ此ノ訓令ハ右作戦計畫ノ枠内ニ於テ各軍ノ作戦計畫ヲ策定スベキ準繩ヲ示スノデアリマス。出先各軍（例ヘバ關東軍ノ如キ）ハ右訓令ニ依リ、當該軍ノ計畫ヲ策定シ概ネ毎年九月末頃迄ニ參謀總長ニ提出シマス。

以上カ帝國ニ於ケル作戦計畫ノ實相デアリマシテ之ハ何處迄モ當該年度間ニ萬一戰爭ガ起ツタナラバト云フ假定ニ基ク計畫ニ過ギナイノデアツテ其ノ實行ハ全ク別個ノ問題デアリマス。即チ廟議開戦ヲ決シタル際初メテ大命ニ依リ實行化セラルルノデアリマス。勿論之レガ發動ニ關シテハ最高ノ幕僚長タル參謀總長ノ惟囑上奏ヲ要スルノデアリマス。若シ右作戦計畫ヲ以テ實行ヲ決定シタル計畫ノ如クニ解スルモノ

ガアリトスレバ、夫レハ大ナル誤リデアリマス。

尙附言致シマスレバ内外ノ情勢當該年度間ニハ戰爭發生ノ公算ナシト判斷セラル、場合ニ於キマシテモ軍ハ一朝一夕ニ整備シ得ザル特質ニ鑑ミ帝國ノ保持スベキ軍備ノ標準トシテ又軍隊教育ノ標準トシテ必要上年度作戰計畫ガ策定セラル、コトモアルノデアリマス。

十、滿洲事變勃發年ニ於ケル作戰計畫ハ昭和六年度作戰計畫トシテ昭和五年ニ策定セラレアルノデアツテ之ヲ提出スレバ當時統帥部ガ滿洲事變ヲ計畫シ若クハ侵略的意志ヲ有シテ居ナカツタト云フコトヲ一目瞭然タランメルコトガ出來マスガ、終戰時之等ハ全部廢却セラレタ由デ殘念デアリマス。當時ノ記憶ヲタドリ其ノ項ニ於ケル統帥部ノ内情ト作戰計畫ノ大要トヲ述ブルニ、昭和六年ハ「ジュネーブル」軍縮會議ノ開催年デ當時軍縮熱極メテ旺シナルモノガアリ吾々作戰計畫ノ當事者ニ於テサヘ軍縮問題ニ没頭シテ居リ對外戰爭ノコトヲ考ヘルヨリモ此ノ軍縮時代ニ處シ如何ニシテ國防上必要最少限ノ兵備ヲ確保センカガムシロ關心事デアリマシタ。從ツテ作戰計畫モ常識的ニ見テ日本ノ兵

力ト其ノ相手國トセラレル國々ノ兵力トニ照應シ國防上此ノ程度ノ作
 戰ガ可能ナルヘシトノ一應ノ輪廓ヲ考ヘタ程度ノモノデアリマシタ。
 此ノ當時參謀本部ニ於テ對支作戰計畫トシテ策定シテ居タ所ハ在滿在
 支ノ權益及居留民ノ現地保護ヲ目的トシ主眼ハ北支及揚子江（長江）
 下流沿岸特ニ南京以東ノ作戰ニアツタノデアリマス。滿洲ニ於ケル關
 東軍ノ兵力ノ如キ僅々一萬前後ノ微々タルモノニ過キズ其ノ平部タル
 獨立守備隊ハ南滿鐵道ノ保護ヲ、他ノ半部タル駐韓師團ハ開戰後内地
 ヨリ派遣セラルヘキ部隊ノ集中掩護ヲ任務トシタモノデアリマシタ。
 對「ソ」作戰計畫ニ於キマシテモ集中地ハ第二松花江以南デアリ主戰
 場ハ、ハルビン以南及洮南附近デアリマシタ。滿洲ニ於テ積極的作戰
 ヲ計畫シタコトハナク、況ンヤ「ソ」聯ニ對シ侵略的作戰計畫ヲ樹立
 スルカ如キ當時ノ國力ガ許シマセンデシタ。
 現ニ此ノ頃帝國陸軍ガ自主的ニ四ヶ師團ノ軍縮ヲ敢行シタノデアリマ
 スガ、其ノトキ少壯將校等ノ反對ヲ押シ切ツテ軍縮ニ同意サレタノハ
 當時ノ參謀本部作戰部長畑俊六少將（後元帥）デアリマス。以テ帝國

ガ軍縮ニ忠實デアリ且侵略戦争ノ意志ノナカッタコトヲ義書キスルモノト思ヒマス。

十一、滿洲事變勃發當時ニ於ケル中央總司令部ノ情況ハ右ニ述ヘマシタ通りデアリマス。テ支全面作戰ヲ實施シヨウナドト考慮シタコトハアリマセンデシタ。此ノ事ハ翌昭和七年二月ノ第一次上海事件ノ際ノ出兵事情ニヨツテモ明カデアリマス。即チ上海附近ニ於ケル支那軍ノ攻撃ニ對シ現地海軍陸戰隊ガ全力ヲ盡シテ居留民ノ保護ニ努メ只管其ノ戰面ノ擴大ヲ防止シテ居タノデアリマスルガ十九路軍ノ壓迫ハ益々強大トナリ海軍ノミデハドワシテモ支ヘ切レタ様ニナリ自衛上已ムナク海軍ノ要求ニ依リ膠州郡除ノ火急應援ヲ實施スルヨウニナリ而モ戰術上ノ不利ヲ承知シナガラ戰局ノ擴大ヲ爲敵ノ背後ニ上陸スルコトナク、多大ノ犠牲ヲ覺悟シテ、敵正面タル上海ニ上陸シ任然居留民ノ保護ニ限定サレタノデアリマス。

此ノ一事ヲ以テシテモ當時如何ニ侵略的意志ガナク又全面的統一計畫ニ依リ行動シタモノデナカッタコトヲ克ク了解シ得ルト思ヒマス。

十二、九、一八事件直前滿洲ニ於ケル關東軍ト張學良ノ軍隊トノ關係ハ
極メテ緊張シ一觸即發的狀態ニアツタコトニ關シテハ、リットン報告
書ニモ記述シテアル通りデアツテ當時血氣ノ多イ者ハ今ニシテ中國側
(張學良)ノ壓迫ニ對シ何トカシテ反撥セネバ日本ハ遂ニ滅亡スルナ
ラムト強ク感シテ居タモノモアツタノデアリマス。

十三、建川少將ノ滿洲派遣ガ偶然ニモ柳條溝事件勃發ノ日ニ當ツタ爲ニ
何カ此ノ事件ト直接連關ガアル様ニ誤解サレル向キガアルヨウデスガ
之ハ全ク左様ナモノデハナカツタノデアリマス。

先ニモ述ベマシタ如ク滿洲ニ於ケル學良側ノ毎日ハ抗日トナリ、權益
ノ侵害居留民ニ對スル迫害トナリ更ニ軍隊ニ對スル侮辱等ガ激シクナ
ル一方デアリマスガ平和外交ノ國策ニ基キ隱忍自重ヲ強ク要求セラレ
マシタ爲軍隊ノ志氣ニモ影響(沮喪)スル虞レガアリマシタ。茲ニ於
テ昭和六年八月頃、南陸相ヨリ輕舉妄動ヲ戒メ且ツ志氣ヲ鼓舞スル目
的ヲ以テ陸軍トシテノ決意ヲ訓示セラレタコトガアリマス。所ガ中村
大尉事件ノ發表モアリ之カ意外ニ強ク反響シ現地テハ今ニモ積極的行

動ニ出ルガ如キ非公式情報ガ飛ビマシタ。ソコデ中央トシテハ斯ル非公式情報ノ根源ヲ闡明シ中央ノ眞ノ意中ヲ關東軍ニ傳ヘル爲ニ建川少將ノ派遣トナツタノデアリマス。

十四、昭和六年九月十八日事變勃發時私ハ胃潰瘍ヲ患ヒ十九日ニハ軍醫軍校ニ入院ノ手筈ヲシテ居マシタガ其ノ朝事件勃發ノ報ヲ受ケ入院ヲ中止シテ急遽登臨シタ様ナ次第デ全クノ突發的事件デアツタノデアリマス。從ツテ朝鮮軍ヨリ一部兵力派遣ノ如キモ陸軍省ト參謀本部トノ意見一致セズ正式命令ハ漸ク九月二十二日事後承諾ノ形ニ於テ發令サレタ様ナ次第デアリマス。

十五、事變勃發直後帝國政府ハ事態不擴大ノ方針ヲ確定シタノデアリマシタ。從テ統帥部モ其ノ方針ニ準據シ九月十九日朝參謀本部陸軍省首腦部會議ニ於テ差當リ關東軍ノ行動ガ其ノ任務ニ基ク自衛權ノ行使ナルコトヲ認ムルト共ニ同日朝鮮軍カラ應援ノ爲ニ滿洲ニ一箇旅團ヲ出動セシムルノ報告ヲ受領シマシタガ統帥部ハ嚴ニ之ヲ抑止スルノ處置ヲ採ツタノデアリマス。之ガ爲該旅團ハ鴨綠江ノ國境ヲ通過スルコト

ガ出來ズ、二日二晩モ暑イ最中ニ車中ニ懽諾サレタノデアリマス。
然シ乍ラ吉林ノ情況ハ一刻ノ猶餘モ許サテ様ニ急變シマシタノデ九月
二十一日遂ニ獨斷越境ヲ見ルニ至ツタノデアリマス。

又獨斷越境後事後承諾的ニ發令セラレタコトハ決シテ不讀大方針ヲ拋擲
シタノデハナク現地ノ情況ガ之レヲ必要トシタコトモワカリ又軍隊統
率上直チニ之レヲ引キ返スコトハ不可能デモアリ、サレバト云ツテ之
レヲ放任スルコトハ將來ニ禍根弊害ヲ殘ス虞ガアリマス。デ命令ヲ發
セラレタノデアリマス。從ツテ此ノ軍隊ハ滿洲ノ情況一時小康ヲ得ル
様ニナリマス。共ニ間モナク朝鮮ニ歸還セシメラレタノデアリマス。
十六、爾來事變解決ノ爲ノ努力ハ中央交渉ヲ通シテ連續行ハレタノデア
リマスガ、日本ノ中央部ニ於ケル現地ノ緊迫事態ニ對スル認識不足ト
中國側ノ夫レ以上ノ認識不足特殊事情（統一獨立國家ニナツテ居ナイ
點）等ニテ進歩セズ停頓ノヤムナキニ至リマシタ。現地關東軍トシテ
ハ中途ニテ放置セバ統制ヲ失ツタ二十萬以上ノ強軍隊ガ全滿ニ匪賊化
シ檢査擁護上ハ勿論人道上ニモ由々シキ問題ヲ惹起スベキ現實ノ情況

ニ直面シ任務ノ完全遂行ヲ念願シテ止マナカッタ次第デアリマス。

十七、中央部トシテハ只徒ニ抽象的不満大方針ヲ唱ヘ元ノ態勢ニカヘルコトノミニ慮シ（當時ソ聯ノ動向ヲ憂慮シ、殆ンド悉ク觀念ニ捉ハレアリ）解決ノ具体策ヲ有セザル恨アリ關東軍トビントノ合ハテ所ガアリマシタノデ現地ニ於ケル實情把握及中央ノ意圖徹底等ノ爲ニ數次ニ亙リ人ヲ派シタノデアリマス。

十八、先ヅ第一、ニハ柳條溝事件勃發ヲ知ルヤ當時陸軍省兵務課長安藤利吉大佐（後大將）ヲ派遣シ本事件ノ真相ヲ調査シマシタ。即チ柳條溝事件ハ關東軍ノ作爲ニヨルモノニアラザルカ、其ノ際ノ軍事行動ハ獨斷越軌ノコトナカリシカ。中國側ノ全面和平申請ヲ殊更ニ排シ一方的行動ニ出デタルコトナカリシカ。等ヲ糾明セシメタノデアリマス。

其ノ結果ハ孰レモ然ラストノ報告ヲ得タノデアリマス。

十九、其ノ第二ハ橋本班ノ派遣デアリマス。之ハ參謀本部第二部長、陸軍少將橋本虎之助ヲ班長トシ、同第一部第二課（作戰）ノ部長タル私支那班ノ今井武夫（當時大尉）及軍政方面ヨリ陸軍省軍務局課員西原

一策（當時少佐）ノ四名ノ一行デアリマス。同班ノ任務ハ中央部ト
 關東軍司令部トノ連絡ヲ取ルノガ主デアリマシテ關東軍ニ對シテ克ク
 帝國々策ヲ考慮シ之ニ重大ナル影響ヲ及ボスベキ事項ニ關シテハ單ニ
 關東軍當局ノ狀況判斷ニノミ依ルコトナク、中央部ニ請訓スル如ク紛
 ムベキコトヲ傳達セントシタセノデアリマス。當時ノ中央部デハ現地
 ノ實情ニ疎ク關東軍ノ行動ニ何重要事項ハ中央ニ請訓シタ上ニ實行セ
 シムル必要ガアルト考ヘタノデアリマス。而シテ以上ノ一行ハ昭和六
 年九月二十四日東京ヲ出發シ同月二十八日奉天着同年十一月三日迄任
 務ニ服シタノデアリマス。

滿洲ニ到着シテ關東軍司令部ニ連絡シ且現地ノ情況ヲ觀察シテ見ルト
 事態ガ明瞭ニナリ關東軍ノ考ヘテ居ル所爲シテアルコトガ逐一了解セ
 ラレ何レモ尤モナ道理アルコトデアリ如何ニモ中央部ニ於ケル認識不
 足現地實情把握ノ不足ガ感セラレ之デハイカヲト云フ感ジヲ強クサセ
 ラレマシタ。

私ハ右滞在の中北滿ノ情勢特ニ日「ソ」衝突ノ可能性ヲ觀察スル爲北滿

ヲ旅行シマタ。ソシテ觀察ノ結果ハ今度ノ事件ヲ速カニ終結セシメル
爲ニハ關東軍カ考ヘテ居ル如ク北滿ノ混亂セサルニ先チ早ク北滿ヲ安
定スルノ要アルコト及本庄軍司令官ノ言ハル、如ク速カニ北滿ヲ安定
セザレバ却ツテ「ソ」聯ヲシテ北滿ニ進入スルノ機會ヲ與ヘ日「ソ」
衝突ノ公算ヲ大ナラシムルモノデアルコトヲ痛感シ其ノ旨ハルビシヨ
リ東京ヘ打電シマシタ。所ガ東京デハ私ガ滿洲ニ來テ事態不擴大ノ國
策ヲ忘レ滿化シタト爲シ（當時滿洲ハ少レオバトラダト稱セラレ其ノ
地ニ來ルト皆其ノ實情ニ惑セラレテ積極的意見ニナルト云ハレテ居タ
モノデアリマス）直チニ歸還方ヲ命セラレマシタ。

右ノ滿洲派遣中私ハ屢々本庄藥軍司令官ノ聲援ニ接シ同司令官カ事變
解決ニ關シテハ卓拔ナル意見ヲ持シテ居ラレ、自己ノ信念ト意圖ニ於
テ關東軍ヲ統率セラレテ居ルヲハツキリ知リマシタ。本庄司令官ハ
ロボツトデアル等ノ世評ハ全ク當ラナイコトヲ知リマシタ。

二十、其ノ第三ハ白川大將（死亡）ノ派遣デアリマス。白川大將ハ當時
軍事參謀官デ陸軍ノ長老デアリマシタ。昭和六年十月十六日東京ニ於

テ所謂十月事件ナルモノカ發覺シマシタ。陸軍中央部デハ大ニ驚キ特ニ關東軍少壯將校ノ向背ニ付取沙汰サレルモノガアリマシタノデ、其ノ説得ノ爲ニ、同大將派遣トナツタモノデ十月二十一日ニ奉天ニ到着シマシタ。當時私ハ橋本班員トシテ奉天ニ居マシタガ、安東迄オ迎ヘニ行キ斯クノ如キハ全クノ「デマ」全クノ杞憂デアツテ、關東軍ハ只管忠勤ヲ敬ンデ居ル最中ノコトトテ中央ノ認識不足ニ對シ非常ニ憤慨シテ居ル様子ヲ報告シマシタ處白川大將ハ面映ユク感ジタ願デ一方安心シテ歸京セラレマシタ。

二十一、其ノ第四ハ昭和六年十一月下旬二宮參謀次長ノ派遣デアリマス先ニモ述ベマシタ如ク今次事件ニ關シ中央部ハ全クノ不道大方針ニテ現地カラ見テ極メテ退嬰消極トセラレアリ。特ニ其ノ領土の野心ハ毛頭ナク、發軔的意圖カナカツタノデアリマス。當時北滿ノ情勢ハ學良麾下ノ軍閥各地ニ踞居シ物情騷然タルモノアリ、現地軍トシテハ北滿安全上「チチハル」占領ヲ絶對必要ナリトシテ居ルニ反シ中央部ニ於テハ日「ソ」衝突ヲ虞レ遠カニ「チチハル」撤兵ヲ必要トシ意見ノ一

致ヲ見ナカッタガ故ニ現地ノ實情ヲ觀察シ要スレバ大命ヲ以テシテモ
 撤兵セシムベク二官參謀次長ヲシテ撤兵ニ關スル命令ヲ抱イテ渡滿セ
 シメタノデアリマシタ。所ガ現地ニ來テ見ルト關東軍ノ採ツタ處置ガ
 適當デアルコトガ判リ撤兵ノ件ハ沙汰止ミトナツタノデアリマス。

二十二、以上ノ如ク事變ノ推移ニ伴ヒ中央ト現地關東軍トノ間ニハ前者
 ハ實情ニ即セズシテ只從ラニ不擴大方針ヲ取り、特ニ此ノ事件ヲ契機
 トシテ、「ソ」聯ガ行動ヲ起スコトヲ恐レ（殆ンド恐慌症約ニ）何トカシ
 テ元ノ態勢ニカヘサン！ノミ考フルニ對シ後者ハ現狀ニ立脚シテ一
 任務ノ完全遂行ヲ念願シ、滿洲ノ治安ヲ回復シ我生命線ヲ確保セント
 スルモノデアリマシテ其ノ目的ニ於テハ一致スルモ其ノ万法ニ於テ一
 致セザル部面ガアツタノデスガ、右ノ派遣等ニヨリ實情ガ遂次明瞭セ
 ラルルニ從ヒ中央ト現地關東軍ノ意見ハ一致スルコトナツタノデア
 リマス。

序デニ事態不擴大ト云フコトニ關シ一言致シマス。
 滿洲事態當初「事態不擴大」ト云フコトガ流行語ノ様ニナツテ居ツタ

ノデアリマス。其ノ内容ナリ具體的の方策ナリハ一同ハツキリセズ極メテ抽象的デ消極政策ノ代名詞ノ様デアツタノデアリマス。所デ荒不大將ガ陸軍大臣ノトキ大臣ガ直接私ニ話サレタノデアリマスガ「事態不擴大」ト云フコトハ之レヲ分析シテ考ヘル必要ガアル即チ地域のニ又兵力的ニ擴大ヲ避ケントセバ却ツテ時間的ニハ擴大スル結果トナルコトアリ、時間的ニ擴大ヲ避ケントセバ兵力的ニ又ハ地域のニ擴大ヲ要スル場合ナシトシナイ。目下最モ必要トスルコトハ時間的ニ速カニ事態ヲ解決スルニアル即チ時間的ニ不擴大ガ主デアリ、之レガ爲メ要スレバ地域の兵力的ニハ擴大モ亦止ムヲ得ヲ所デアルト云ハレタノデアリマスガ私ハ其ノ卓見ニ敬意ヲ表シタノデアリマス。

事態勃發以來遂次兵力モ増加セラレ地域モ擴大セラレマシタガ之レハ決シテ不擴大方針ヲ放擲シタノデハナク自然ノ勢ガソウナツタノデ事態解決ニ長時間ヲ要シタコトハ寧ロ「事態不擴大」ノ言葉ニ眩惑シテ兵力的ニ又地域のニ遠慮シ過ギタ結果トサヘ考ヘラル、次第デアリマス。

二十三、柳條溝事件ニ關シテ發セル關東軍ノ軍事行動ハ先ニモ述ベマシタ
如ク、當時ノ客觀的情勢ヨリ不可避ノ自衛行動デアツタコトハ私、橋
本班ノ一員トシテ現地ニ赴キ實情ヲ知ルニ及ビ判ツテリワカリマシタ
假令柳條溝ノ爆破事件カ惹起シナクトモ河等カノ機會ニテ爆發ノ危機
ニアツタコトヲ了解シマシタ。柳條溝事件ノ眞因ニ付テハ、リットン
調査團ニ於テモ之ヲ証明シ得ズ永久ノ謎カト存ジマスガ、新ル事柄ハ
本質的宿命的ナル事柄ノ推移ニ對シテ餘リ大ナル事柄デナイト存ジマ
ス。

二十四、柳條溝事件以來ノ關東軍ノ行動ガ敏速デ成功的デアツタガ爲メ
ニ之レヲ計畫的行動ナリト稱スル向ガアルヨウデアリマスガ、之レハ
素人ノ見解デアリマシテ軍事専門家ヲ以テ評セシムレバ幾多ノ錯誤ガ
アリ常駐ノ軍ノ行動トシテハ随分マズイ作戰ヲモヤツテ居マス。其ノ
一例ヲ私ガ橋本班員トシテ實視シタ事ニ付申シマスレバ寬城子攻撃ノ
際ノ如キ或ル部隊ハ演習ト誤解シテ出動シ又裝備セラレタ山砲モ當日
手入ノ爲メ分解セラレアリ之レヲ結合スルコトガ出來ズ長春ヨリ山砲

出身ノ在郷軍人ヲ戰場ニ招致シテ漸ク結合シ射撃ニ移ツタ様ナ始末デ此ノ方面ノ部隊ハ非常ナ苦戦ニ陥リ必要以上ノ損害ヲ出シタ様ナ戦例モアリマシタ。

二十五、事變中關東軍ハ中央カラ兵力使用ノ控制ヲ受ケ非常ナ苦境ニ立ツタコトモ屢々アツタ様デアリマス。例ヘバ朝鮮軍ノ慰援ヲ停メラレタ爲メニ奉天警備ノ兵力皆無トナリ僅カニ在郷軍人等ヲ以テ義勇隊ヲ編成シテ心細イ警備ヲシタ如キ、齊々哈爾濱ニ向フ追擊戰中屢々進出線ヲ限定セラレ北滿鐵道ノ横斷ニハ踏切り以外ノ通過ヲ禁止セラレタルガ如キ、錦州及哈爾濱ニ進出スルニ當リ中止ヲ命ゼラレテ進出セル軍隊ヲ引き返シタルガ如キ等デアリマス。

二十六、關東軍ハ之ニ對シ意見具申ヲシ時ニハ其ノ指令ヲ待チ得ズシテ獨斷行動ニ出デタ場合モアリマスガ、之レハ決シテ越軌ノ行動トノミ斷ジ得マセン。其ノ大部ハ容認セラルベキモノデアリマス。

二十七、茲ニ關東軍ノ獨斷專行ノコトニ付テ述べマス。
關東軍司令官ハ奉勅命令ヲ受ケタ場合ハ絕對ニ之レニ服従スルハ勿論

デアリマスガ然ラザル場合ハ適宜ノ處置ヲ軍司令官ノ責任ニ於テ獨斷行動ニ出ツベキハ我軍ニ於テ軍事常識トシテ容認セラレテ居ル所デアリマス。其ノ結果時ニハ軍ト參謀本部トノ間ニ意見ノ相違ヲ見ルガ如キコトモナシトセヲデアリマス。中央ノ認識ガ現地ニ即セズ機宜ニ適スル處置ガ選レ現地ニ於テ大命ヲ待ナ切レズシテ獨斷行動ニ出ズル場合モナシトシナカツタノデ參謀本部ハ現地ト連絡ヲ密ニスルト共ニ昭和六年十一月五日以來參謀總長ニ於テ或ル程度關東軍司令官ヲ直接命令シ得ル權限ヲ有スルヨウニナリ中央ノ統制ハ完璧トナツタノデアリマス。

二十八、滿洲ノ建國ニ關スル當時ノ構想ニ付テ申上マス。滿洲事變勃發後之カ處理ニ付テハ中央統帥部ニ於テハ確乎タル構想ナク、思想ハ區々デアリマシタ。之ガ纏ルマデニハ随分時間ヲ要シタノデアリマス。獨立國家說ノ如キ卓拔ナ意見ヲ持ツタモノハ當時ナカツタト思ヒマス私ガ橋本班員トシテ渡滿中國軍大臣南大將ヨリ本庄軍司令官ニ對シ何人ニ政權ヲ擔當セシムベキヤ等ノ内政問題ニハ出先軍ニ於テハ干與ス

ベカラズトサヘ示サレアリ、本庄軍司令官ハ速カニ滿洲ノ治安ヲ保持シテ我ガ權益並ニ居留民ヲ保護スベキ任務達成ノ爲滿洲ヲ安定セシムルニ足ル親日政權ノ樹立ヲ希望シテ居ラレマシタ

我ハ十月半バ頃干沖漢氏（死亡）ノ建國ノ理想ナルモノヲ聞イタノデス。同氏ノ意見ハ歴史ヲ按ズルニ支那民族ハ武力ヲ正シク行使シ得タ民族デアル、昔ヨリ兵ハ利器ナリトシ之ヲ用フルトキハ必ず霸道のナル故ニ滿洲ハ武力ナキ王道ニ則ル平和境トスベキデアル、即チ五族協和ノ王道樂土ヲ建設ヘベキデアルト云フノデアリマス

私ハ先ニ軍縮問題デ述ベマシタ如ク當時考ヘテ居ツタ理想トモ一致シマスノデ干沖漢氏ノ卓見ニハ大イニ敬意ヲ表シ且共鳴シテ居ツタ次第デアリマス。關東軍ヨリハ十一月始メ私ガ歸京ノ挨拶ヲ致シマシタ際始メテ片倉參謀ヨリ事懸ノ推移カラ見テ滿洲ヲ獨立國家トシテ解決セラレルノガ理想ダカラ歸京後ハ現地ノ空氣ト共ニ其ノ意見ヲ内地要路ノ人々ニ傳ヘ之レガ實現ニ努力セラレ度旨依頼ヲ受ケ歸任後各方面ニ傳ヘタノデアリマスガ當時最モ積極的意見ノ所有者ト目サレテ居ツ

參謀本部第一部長建川少將ヤ支那班長根本中佐デサヘ之ハ殆ンド同
 題トセズ獨立政權位ガ續ノ山ダト云ハレタ程デアリマシタ。
 即チ中央デハ獨立國家ノ樹立ト云フ様ナ意大ナル轉想ハ全クナク只
 カニ事件ヲ早ク解決スルコトノミヲ考ヘテ居ツタノデアリマス。
 夫レガ事件ヲ契機トシテ在滿民衆ノ澎湃タル獨立ノ思想ガ發展シ
 ニ獨立國ノ樹立トナツタノデアリマス。
 以上ノ機ナ次第デアリマシテ滿洲建國ハ事變前ヨリ動然トシ又ハ共同
 謀議ヲ以テ行ハレタ如キコトハ絶對ニナク、況ンヤ實上の野心ニ基ク
 擬成的國家ヲ人爲的ニ作ツタモノニアラズ眞ニ理想ニ基ク建國ノ勢デ
 アリマシテ私ヲシテ云ハシメレバ天意ニ依ル神ヲザトシテ成リ立ツタ
 モノデアリ滿洲ガ理想ノ獨立國家デアツテコソ東洋平和ハ保タレ世界
 平和ノ一大礎石タリ得ルモノト今尙信ジテ居ルモノデアリマス。

宣
誓
書

フ 良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ欺秘セズ又何事ヲモ隱加セザルコトヲ誓

(署名
捺印)

遠
藤
三
郎

昭和二十一年（一九四六年）十月十二日於東京

供 送 者 遠 藤 三 郎

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日 於同所

立會人 阪 登ノ
淳 吉